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Abstract

This paper analyses bank relative riskiness by testing the sensitivity of AsiaPacific banks to overall market risk, global credit risk shocks, interest rate
risk shocks and maturity risk shocks. The banks’ risk profiles are categorised
according to their capitalisation levels and functional degree of
diversification. Our results indicate that highly capitalised banks yield higher
average stock returns whilst functionally diversified banks have less volatile
returns. Generally, banks that adopt capital adequacy guidelines and hold
higher capital levels have greater protection from these risks. Functionally
diversified banks are also more strongly positioned against system-wide
shocks to the banking sector.
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1.

Introduction
The last 100 years have seen banks coping with problems relating to asymmetric

information during and following episodes of shocks to the banking system. These shocks
lead to a deterioration of the overall economic environment and more frequently, increased
volatility levels in financial markets. During economic upswings, lending volumes tend to rise
but the banks’ natural response during downswings would be to tighten lending practices and
sometimes invoke credit rationing. Nonetheless, existing loans and open trading positions
threaten the value of banks’ as firms.
Bank assets are relatively opaque to the general public as they cannot be seen directly. If
markets are efficient, then one way to observe the impact of exogenous economic events on
the financial healthiness of banks is to examine the stock market’s evaluation of bank equity.
As financial intermediaries, banks are inherently exposed to credit, interest rate, market,
liquidity, foreign exchange, and country risks. Some risks are likely to have more significant
effects on some banks than others, and they are sometimes inter-related.
Adverse shifts in financial market conditions can worsen the creditworthiness of banks’
borrowers. To manage their exposure against some of the associated risks, banks can hedge
risky positions by using “off-balance sheet” activities. Other risk management methods
include functional diversification of income sources and the holding of higher capital levels to
back up riskier loans. Since banks now operate globally, not only are they concerned with
domestic economic conditions, but shocks to the global financial system affect them too.
The widely accepted risk-based capital adequacy ratio (RBC) standard of 8% proposed
by the Bank of International Settlements has now been adopted by banking systems in both
developed and emerging economies as a benchmark in the formulation of capital regulation
policies. However, banks can signal their financial strength and maintain confidence of their
own creditworthiness by choosing to hold higher capital levels. Capital “cushioning” can
protect against potential contingent losses, thereby lowering the risk of bank failure and can
implicitly lead to lower funding costs. This in turn, implies that banks with a relatively higher
level of capitalisation should be less sensitive to adverse changes in market and credit
conditions and thereby less sensitive to credit risk (Landschoot and Vander Vennet, 2001).
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In their efforts to maintain competitiveness in an increasingly sophisticated and global
financial market system, a popular trend for banks is to adopt functional diversification,
integrating non-traditional financial services such as commercial banking, insurance,
investments and superannuation into their business model. Functional diversification reduces
the dependence on interest income and hence, increases the proportion of non-interest income.
Dewenter and Hess (1998) provide evidence that universal banks tend to be less risky than
their specialised counterparts. Therefore, this implies that functionally diversified banks
should be less sensitive towards adverse changes to regional and international credit and
interest rate risk compared to specialised banks.
This paper assesses the sensitivity of Asia-Pacific banks grouped under different risk
profiles according to their degrees of capitalisation and functional diversification against
changes to global credit risk, and to regional market, interest rate and maturity risks.1 In
comparison with previous studies, not all of the countries in our sample adopted the BIS
capital adequacy standard of 8%. We explore the desirability for banks in the Asia-Pacific
region to adopt stricter capital adequacy rules and to become more functionally diversified.
We proceed to assess their risk premiums, which will indicate the propensity of each profile
group to hedge against each risk component. A statistical strength of our study is the
avoidance of the errors-in-the-variables problem, achieved by forming equally weighted and
value weighted portfolios as well as using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) as a
means of estimation of our four-factor APT model.
We draw three main lessons drawn from the study: first, less diversified banks rely
heavily on interest income and so must aim to maintain high capital levels to protect against
deterioration of their borrowers’ creditworthiness. Second, diversified banks should not be
misled to believe that diversification allows for riskier lending practices. Finally, in order for
capital adequacy ratios to be an effective strengthening tool and bulwark against risks,
accounting and classification standards in relation to what constitutes equity levels should be
consistent with those of developed economies and international standards so as to ensure
consistency in international comparisons.
The organisation of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we review the literature relating
to the importance of financial and banking system stability, developments and possible
implications of bank regulation and market disciplinary forces and commonly applied
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indicators of bank fragility. Section 3 sets out our proposed four-factor model and our
research hypotheses. We discuss our general procedure, data selection and analysis in Section
4. Our findings follow in Section 5, where we present our empirical results and derive some
general conclusions about the characteristics of each risk profile group and we make some
suggestions about future risk management developments for Asia-Pacific banks. Section 6
concludes.

2.

Literature Review
Bank crises can occur in both developed and emerging economies. Kaminsky and

Reinhart (1999) and Rossi (1999) established a causal relationship between banking and
currency crises and found that during recessions, banks typically suffer substantial losses,
sometimes even to the extent of requiring costly government bailouts. Hoggarth, Reis and
Saporta (2002) provide an extensive review of the fiscal and output losses incurred by bank
crises for both developed and emerging economies. Over the period of 1992 – 2002, 24 major
crises studied indicated that losses averaged from 15 – 20% of GDP and the restoration costs
for distressed banks were much larger for emerging economies that for those with higher
degrees of banking intermediation. They also note that currency crises and large recessions
that worsen economic conditions can ultimately translate into banking crises for these
emerging economies.
Thus, regulation of the banking systems is crucial for both financial systems and the
smooth operation of economies. While it is widely known that capital adequacy ratios have
had significant impact on banks’ risk taking behaviour, studies on this issue have form two
main streams. The first school of thought argues that the regulation causes banks to withstand
negative shocks. The other stream suggests that regulation causes banks to change their
attitudes towards risk taking and instead could have a variety of effects, including causing
banks to prefer less risky loans so as to reduce their capital held, thus reducing banks’ overall
profitability (Chiuri, Ferri and Majnoni, 2002). Nevertheless, this literature on the impact of
RBC for bank’s asset risk is quite an extensive and sometimes a contradictory one. For
example Furlong and Keeley (1989) show that capital requirements reduce risk-taking
incentives in the case of value-maximising banks. Whilst Flannery (1989) suggests that there
actually might be an inducement towards higher risk-taking. Koen and Santomero (1980) and
Rochet (1992) demonstrate in a mean variance framework that RBC combined with
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inappropriate risk weights may increase bank riskiness. Some, such as Boot and Greenbaum
(1993) have argued that RBC requirements reduce monitoring incentives and this then serves
to reduce the quality of bank portfolios. Gehrig (1995) suggests that RBC affect the nature of
strategic competition between banks. Finally, Blum (1999) also argues that in a dynamic
framework RBC may increase a bank’s riskiness.
However, Saunders (2002) comments that the introduction of capital adequacy
standards may cause banks to prefer lending to the public sector rather than the private sector,
since capital requirements would be lower. In the case of emerging economies with underdeveloped capital markets, this would lead to a credit shortage for the private sector that
depends heavily on bank credit.2
A further issue concerns the fact that RBC may be open to manipulation. Jones (2000)
suggests that securitisation and other financial innovations have provided opportunities for
banks to substantially reduce their RBC based measures of risk. This is typically matched by
little reduction in actual economic risks. He terms this process ‘regulatory capital arbitrage’.
This leads to the possibility that reported RBC ratios could mask deterioration in the true
financial conditions of banks. Furthermore, there may be associated competitive inequities in
that regulatory capital arbitrage may not be equally available to all banks and may be related
to differences in economies of scale and scope, or to differences in accounting, supervisory
and legal regimes.
This is related to the issue that evidence on the usefulness of capital adequacy ratios
might not equally apply to emerging markets. Sach, Tornell and Velasco (1996) point out that
capital adequacy and liquidity standards typically emphasised in developed economies may
not be sufficient to regulate the more volatile emerging markets. Similarly, Rojas-Suarez
(2001) also found that capital standards have little supervisory usefulness in emerging
markets due to the structure of their financial sectors in comparison to developed economies.
Recent trends focus on the issue of market discipline as a supplementary tool to
traditional supervisory standards. Crockett (2002) points out that market forces are powerful
disciplinary tools because of the speed and efficiency in which information is reflected in
prices. Good risk taking behaviour will be rewarded with share price increases. Sironi (2002)
also states two reasons for the need for market discipline. First, because banks tend to operate
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globally, their domestic regulator has limited control on their risk taking behaviour. Secondly,
with the implementation of capital adequacy standards, banks are now applying their own
market risk models to determine capital levels provided that they conform to general
guidelines of the BIS, and therefore there is much room for independent judgement.3
Studies by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000)
focus on the macroeconomic factors that help predict banking and currency crises. However,
few studies have tried to analyse the origins of the East Asian crisis using individual bank
data. Bongini, Claessens and Ferri (2001) addressed this issue by using traditional CAMELtype indicators to help predict bank distress and failure in the East Asian crisis countries.4
Bongini, Laeven and Majnoni (2002) studied banks active before and during the Asian
currency crises and found that stock prices and credit ratings did not outperform balance sheet
information as indicators of fragility and that stock market information responded much faster
to changing financial conditions compared to credit ratings. Konishi and Yasuda (2004)
analyse risk taking by Japanese banks and conclude that the adoption of RBC has served to
reduce risk-taking by Japanese banks.
Recent studies have argued that public information about the impact of economic events
relevant to the financial health of banks should be reflected in stock market valuation. The
evidence suggests that the market is able to efficiently react to information concerning
individual banks and to changes in the regulatory environment. This suggests that markets
have the ability to assess the quality of banks’ assets. Since stock price information can
provide valuable information about the soundness of banks and is relatively easy to obtain,
using this type of information could be beneficial for both investors and prudential regulators
(Berger, Davies and Flannery, 2000, De Young; Flannery, Lang and Sorescu, 2001; Bongini
et al., 2002).

3.

Testing Hypotheses and methodology
We used a four-factor APT model to test the sensitivity of bank returns to overall

market risk (M), credit risk shocks (CR), interest rate risk shocks (IR) and maturity risk shocks
(MR). If markets are efficient, then banks returns should only react to unanticipated
components of the risk factors. Related studies that have examined the effects of market,
credit and maturity risks include Dewenter and Hess (1988), Demsetz and Strahan (1998) and
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Landschoot and Vander Vennet (2001). Other studies such as those by Sweeney and Warga
(1986), Yourougou (1990), Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992) and Allen and Jagtiani
(1996) have looked at the effects of market and interest rate risks on bank returns.
Assuming bank returns ( Rti ) follow a factor model of the form specified by Ross (1976)
and Shanken (1982)5:
Rti = α + β M UM t + β CR UCRt + β IR UIRt + β MR UMRt + ε ti

(1)

where UM t = M t − µ Mt , UCRt = CRt − µ CRt , UIRt = IRt − µ IRt and UMRt = MRt − µ MRt are
the unexpected parts of the market, credit, interest rate and maturity risk factors at time t. β M ,

β CR , β IR and β MR are the loadings on the state variables, α is a constant term and ε ti is the
idiosyncratic error term.
The second part of our analysis examines the factor betas in (1) to see if they translate into
economically meaningful risk premiums. Expanding from the APT framework, the second
pass regression yields the associated risk premiums λ M , λCR , λ IR and λ MR (Shanken, 1982).
We augment equation (1) into the representation:
Rti = α + β M [ M t − µ Mt ] + β CR [CRt − µ CRt ] + β IR [ IRt − µ IRt ] + β MR [ MRt − µ MRt ] + ε ti

(2)
Under the condition of no-arbitrage, (2) implies that:
i
i
µ Ri = λ0 + β Mi λ M + β CR
λCR + β IRi λ IR + β MR
λ MR

(3)

If there is a riskless asset with a return of µ RF , then β F = 0 and µ RF = λ0 . If there is no
riskless asset, then λ0 would be the expected rate of return on a zero-beta portfolio.
By substituting equation (2) into (3), the empirical model for the APT may be expressed
as:
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i
i
Rti = λ0 + β Mi [λ M − µ M ] + β CR
[λCR − µ CR ] + β IRi [λ IR − µ IR ] + β MR
[λ MR − µ MR ]
i
i
+ β Mi M t + β CR
CRt + β IRi IRt + β MR
MRt + ε ti

(4)

Since the factors are exogenously specified as the innovations of the factors, equation (4)
includes the risk shocks, UM, UCR, UIR and UMR. Finally, denoting δM = λM – µM,

δCR = λCR – µCR, δIR = λIR – µIR and δMR = λMR – µMR, and replacing each factor by its
innovation, (4) can be specified as:
i
i
i
Rti = λ0 + β Mi δ M + β CR
δ CR + β IRi δ IR + β MR
δ MR + β Mi UM t + β CR
UCRt
i
+ β IRi UIRt + β MR
UMRt + ε ti

(5)

Following the approaches of Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Chen, Roll and Ross
(1986), estimating equation (1) could enable the derivation of the factor betas for each
individual bank and these beta estimates from the first pass regression could be applied as
independent variables in the second pass regression of (3) to obtain estimates for the factor
risk premiums. However, equation (3) is specified in terms of true betas, whereas the first
pass regression only yields estimates for the betas. Fama and MacBeth (1973) warn that this
two step approach results in an errors-in-variables problem, implying that the estimates are
inconsistent and biased.
To control for this problem, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and Banz (1981) suggest
grouping returns into equally weighted and value weighted portfolios to reduce the noise of
individual returns. Our study also constructs equally weighted and value weighted portfolios
for each risk group category. We construct equally weighted portfolios since systematic risk
should affect all banks, regardless of size. However, an alternative argument is that large
banks are those that matter when financial system stability is concerned and therefore, value
weighted portfolios must be used.
A better approach to avoid the problem of errors-in-variables is to simultaneously
estimate the betas and risk premiums for the factors using the GMM (Hansen, 1982). This
technique allows us to use time series together with cross sectional information and constrains
the λ’s and µ’s of each factor to be identical across individual banks and for portfolios of
banks in each risk group. GMM also allows for estimation despite the presence of serial
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correlation and heteroskedasticity in the factors. It chooses the factor betas that minimises the
quadratic form in the sample moment conditions:

β̂ GMM = arg min m (β)´ W m (β)
β

(6)

β is a K-vector of parameters, m (β) is an L-vector of orthogonality conditions, and W is an
T×T positive definite weighting matrix. An important contribution by Hansen (1982) is to
point out that setting W = S-1, where S-1 is the inverse of an asymptotic covariance matrix,
then W is optimal in the sense that it yields the estimated parameters β̂ with the smallest
asymptotic variance. More weight is attached to the moment conditions that have smaller
variances.
The main hypotheses in our study, based on the risk factors faced by banks inherent in
the process of financial intermediation are:
•

Banks are exposed to credit risk due to the creditworthiness of their borrowers. Hence, it
i
is expected that their stock returns exhibit sensitivity to credit risk shocks ( β CR
< 0 ) and

the risk premium should be positive (λCR > 0). The risk premium for unanticipated
shocks to credit spread should be positive because banks would want to hedge against
unanticipated increases in the aggregate risk premium accompanying an increase in
uncertainty (Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986).
•

Functionally diversified banks should be less sensitive to credit risk shocks than
specialised banks, because they have lesser reliance on loans as a source of income
FD
NFD
). Universal banking carries diversification benefits applied similarly to
( β CR
< β CR

portfolio theory concepts (Dewenter and Hess, 1988).
•

Highly capitalised banks should be less sensitive to credit risk shocks than those with
HC
PC
), because they can use their equity as working
lower equity to asset ratios ( β CR
< β CR

capital to cover themselves against losses (Berger, 1995).

•

The sensitivity of banks with respect to credit risk differs within subgroups. Hence, the
stock market should be able to assess the cross-sectional differences of banks’ credit
risk exposure (Fama and French, 1993).

•

Shocks to the short-term interest rate (UIR) and the maturity spread (UMR) affect
banks’ interest income. While it can be expected that ( β IRi < 0 ), the associated risk
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premium (λIR >0) should also be positive because banks would want to limit their
potential downside risk of earnings. Depending on the ratio of long to short-term assets,
changes to the maturity spread can affect bank returns positively or negatively
i
( β MR
≠ 0 ), and so the propensity for banks to hedge this imbalance would also be of

opposite sign.

4.

The estimation sample and testing strategy
We assessed the sensitivity of banks categorised under four different risk profiles in

Australia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand against changes to global credit risk, regional market,
interest rate and maturity risks.6
Monthly stock returns for our sample of 162 banks from the period of the 1st January
1992 to 1st January 2002 were used. A broad market proxy (M) was constructed using a
regional index comprising the major stock exchanges of each country included in the sample,
value-weighted by market capitalisation.
The credit spread (CR) used in the estimations is the difference between a portfolio of
corporate bond yields and government bonds. The credit spread has been used in various
studies such as Chen et al. (1986) as a proxy for credit risk. This global portfolio comprises
yields for Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K. and U.S. The composite
measure of world credit risk is constructed as the GDP-weighted average of spreads for those
countries. A credit spread measure comprising a regional portfolio for the 11 sample countries
could not be used because consistent data for each country dating back to 1992 could not be
obtained from Datastream.
The interest rate factor (IR) is a constructed portfolio of the GDP-weighted average 3month indicator rate for Australia, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore. Since the corresponding
3-month rates for the other countries in the sample was unavailable from Datastream, this
interest rate factor should serve as a good proxy for interest rate movements for the East
Asian region.
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The maturity spread (MR) is the difference between a 10-year government bond yield
and the 3-month interest rate for Australia, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore. This regional
portfolio was constructed as the GDP-weighted average of spreads for those countries. Again,
the relevant data for this measure could not be obtained from Datastream for the rest of the
countries in the sample study due to inconsistent start dates and definitions.
Accounting data for each bank in the sample was also collected. Information on Total
Income, Total Assets, Net Interest Income and Total Income was obtained from Datastream.
From this, Non-Interest Income was calculated by taking the difference between Total Income
and Net Interest Income. The banks were grouped into one of four risk profile groups,
namely:
•

Highly Capitalised/ Functionally Diversified (HCFD)

•

Highly Capitalised/ Not Functionally Diversified (HCNFD)

•

Poorly Capitalised/ Functionally Diversified (PCFD)

•

Poorly Capitalised/ Not Functionally Diversified (PCNFD)
Highly Capitalised (HC) banks are those that have a total equity to assets ratio of more

than 6%, while Poorly Capitalised (PC) banks are those with ratios less than 6%. Australia
conforms to the 8% capital adequacy guideline where it is stipulated that 4% must be made up
of Tier 1 Core Capital (Saunders & Lange, 2000, p. 322). Tier 1 capital is closely linked to a
bank’s book value of equity reflecting the concept of the core capital contribution of a bank’s
owners. It includes the book value of ordinary shares, an amount of irredeemable preference
shares and minority equity interests held by the bank in subsidiaries. Therefore, the measure
of total equity reported for those banks should capture Tier 1 capital. The benchmark of 6%
was chosen because it is a fair margin above the 4% minimum sufficient to be considered
high capitalisation.
For a bank to be categorised as Functionally Diversified (FD), the ratio of non-interest
income to total income has to be greater than 15% as applied by Vander Vennet and
Landschoot (2001). Banks whose proportion of non-interest income to total income was less
than 15% are considered Not Functionally Diversified (NFD) as they have heavier reliance on
the interest margin between their assets and liabilities for profitability.
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The grouping of the total 162 banks in the sample can be summarised as follows:
[Insert table 1 here]
There are a total of 56 banks classified as HCFD, while 98 banks are PCFD. This is because
almost half of the sample banks taken were Japanese banks, and they have been found to
enjoy a funding cost advantage by operating with significantly lower capital-to-assets ratio
compared to other G10 countries (Wagster, 1996). Before the Basel Capital Accord was
imposed, the average capital-to-assets ratio was 2.11% and these low levels have been
persistent even in recent years. The low capital levels of these banks may bias our tests and so
a new risk profile group PCFD2 was included in the analysis, which excludes all Japanese
banks.7
The factors M, CR, IR and MR were tested for unit roots and differenced accordingly
into stationary processes. Then, the unanticipated components of the factors were derived
using a VAR framework and using GMM, we regressed the returns of each bank in the
portfolios against the derived unanticipated factors of UM, UCR, UIR and UMR. We applied
the JT test for model fit (Hansen, 1982) to ensure that the model is accurately specified. Then,
the β estimates were applied as inputs into the second pass regression to yield the λ’s.

5.

Empirical results
We conducted the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test for unit roots on M, CR, IR and

MR up to a lag order of 5. We compared the test statistics for the highest AIC and SBC values
against a 5% critical value. We found that while M is a stationary process and can be applied
as UM into the estimation model, CR, IR and MR were non-stationary I(1) processes and had
to be differenced before applied as UCR, UIR and UMR.
By specifying CR, IR and MR as variables in a VAR framework, and the intercept term
C, M and M(-1) as the deterministic components, we selected a maximum order of 5 for the
VAR.8 The AIC, SBC and LR tests were all consistent in selecting a VAR of order 1. Then,
the residuals for CR, IR and MR were estimated and saved as UCR, UIR and UMR. Table 2
presents the results of the VAR estimation. For CR, the residuals appear to be normally
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distributed white noise, and have no serial correlation or heteroskedasticity. The residuals for
IR show serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and are not normally distributed. Although MR’s
residuals have no serial correlation or heteroskedasticity, they do not conform to a normal
distribution. Because the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity does not affect
the GMM estimation technique, and that the underlying distribution does not necessarily need
to conform to a normal distribution (Hansen and West, 2002), UCR, UIR and UMR can be
applied in our GMM framework. However, GMM does require stationarity in variables
(Enders, 1995) and since our ADF tests confirm that UCR, UIR and UMR are stationary I(0)
processes, we use them in our GMM estimation.
[Insert table 2 here]
We also tested our VAR(1) model for cointegrating relationships to establish the
underlying dynamics of the variables. Table 3 reports the results of the Johansen ML test for
cointegration. The test was conducted with no restrictions imposed on the intercepts and
trends so as not to lose any valuable information about the cointegration between variables.
The r values reported were used to determine the number of linearly dependent cointegrating
vectors.
[Insert table 3 here]
The results of the first two tests based on maximal eigenvalues and trace statistics show
that there are not cointegrating relationships between CR, IR and MR. However, based on
model selection criteria, the AIC and HQC report three cointegrating relationships whereas
SBC indicates no cointegration. Overall, the evidence is generally in favour of no
cointegration between the factors. Since the CR, IR and MR are not cointegrated, therefore
UCR, UIR and UMR will also not have causal relationships between them.9
In our first pass regressions, we used one period lagged values of the dependent and
explanatory variables as the vector of instruments, suggested by Cochrane (1999). A time
series HAC weighting matrix was selected, so that the estimated parameters would be robust
to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of an unknown form. Specifically, the Bartlett kernel
and appropriate bandwidth for the kernel proposed by Newey and West (1987) was applied
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and this determines the functional form of the kernel used to weight the autocovariances in the
computation of the weighting matrix.
A summary of the number of statistically significant beta estimates derived from the
sample t-statistics, as well as the proportion in relevance to their sample size is shown in table
4. We found that HCFD has the highest proportion of statistical significance towards UCR
compared to its less capitalised counterpart PCFD (and PCFD2). This implies that HCFD
banks keep higher levels of capital due to its greater sensitivity to credit risk. All the groups
exhibit similar proportions of sensitivities to interest rate risk, with HCFD being most
susceptible. PCFD banks are most sensitive to market risk, most likely due to their
diversification activities being subject to market movements while they do not keep adequate
capital levels to bolster against possible losses. HCNFD and PCNFD are very sensitive
towards unanticipated market risk UM, most likely because their heavy reliance on traditional
forms of banking activities as a source of income. If these banks focus on merely making
loans and taking deposits, sudden upswings in the stock markets may result in less deposits
and loans as the equity market become more attractive. Subsequently, sudden downswings in
the stock markets may induce higher saving levels (and more interest to be paid out) and
higher default rate on loans. This issue applies to bank in all risk groups but may affect less
diversified banks to a greater extent than diversified ones.
[Insert table 4 here]
Table 5 reports the average estimated betas for each factor both for equally and value
weighted portfolios in each risk profile group, and a general ranking of the sensitivities of
each group against the unexpected factors. The average returns for both equally and value
weighted portfolios indicate that highly capitalised banks perform better than their poorly
capitalised counterparts. Also, diversified banks had lower standard deviation of returns
compared to their specialised counterparts in the case of value weighted portfolios.
[Insert table 5 here]
Based on our main hypotheses, the ranking provide mixed results, with inconsistencies
in the findings for equally weighted portfolios. However, the rankings for value weighted
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portfolios are uniform across all variables, providing evidence in support of the argument that
larger banks are those that matter when the stability of financial markets are concerned.
We found that the weakest risk profile is the PCNFD group. Due to poor capital levels,
these banks are particularly susceptible to sudden changes in market, credit, interest rate and
maturity risks. Additionally, without adequate diversification, these banks are unable to
engage in other activities to reduce the heavy reliance on interest income.
HCFD banks also exhibited surprisingly poor insulation against unexpected shocks,
although our hypotheses expected this group to be the strongest. A possible explanation of
this is that high capitalisation has nothing to do with strengthening the banks, but instead
reflect the deterioration of creditworthiness of their borrowers. Another plausible conclusion
relates to the fact that East Asian banks tend to have more concentrated ownership patterns,
thus making the banks very risky. Sach et al., 1996 have already noted that the
implementation of capital standards have not been particularly encouraging for emerging
markets. Our results for HCFD banks support Rojas-Suarez’s (2001) findings that capitals
standards for emerging markets do not possess useful supervisory powers compared to
developed economies. This is due to the diverse structures of their financial sectors, different
accounting standards and most importantly, lack of standardisation in the classification of
capital to be included in capital adequacy ratios.
The PCFD banks were better insulated against the risk factors. However, the importance
of high capital levels should not be quickly dismissed, as our rankings reveal that HCNFD
banks were on average, the least sensitive against the unanticipated risk factors.
We then applied the JT test for over-identifying restrictions on the estimated model to
see how well our model “fitted” the data. The test statistic conforms to a chi-squared
distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions,
L – K. There were nine instruments and five parameters estimated, and therefore we used four
over-identifying restrictions. Table 6 summarises the number of banks in each risk profile
group that rejected the null hypothesis. In our estimation of HCFD banks, only 6 out of 56
banks rejected the null hypothesis. Similarly, only 6 out of 98 PCFD banks, and 4 out of 27
PCFD2 banks indicated poor model fit. Overall, our results indicate that the GMM estimation
of our four-factor model has been efficient and reliable.
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[Insert table 6 here]
We then used the factor betas derived from the first-pass regressions of (1) as the
explanatory variables in the cross-sectional regressions of (3). Table 7 reports the results of
our second-pass regressions.
[Insert table 7 here]
For UM, the equally and value weighted βUM for HCFD banks is positive and the risk
premium λUM is also positive. This implies that HCFD banks do not wish to hedge against
unanticipated market risk. Our findings also indicate the same for HCNFD banks. However,
for equally weighted PCFD and PCNFD banks, the average βUM was positive and λUM was
found to be negative. Therefore this leads to a conclusion in support of Chen et al. (1986) that
poorly capitalised banks seek to hedge against UM.
Upon examination of UCR, the βCR for equally and value weighted portfolios of HCFD
banks are both negative. The value weighted portfolio estimate for λCR is negative, consistent
with our hypothesis. The results for HCNFD banks are mixed however, where the equally
weighted beta and risk premium estimates are both negative, implying that HCNFD banks do
not wish to hedge against unanticipated credit risk. However, in the results of HCNFD banks
in the value weighted case indicate a propensity to hedge. In both PCFD2’s portfolios, both
the beta and risk premium estimates are negative, leading to our conclusion that these banks
do not wish to hedge against credit risk. PCNFD banks have a positive beta and risk premium
of the opposite sign in an equally weighted case implying that they do wish to hedge against
credit risk but the results from a value weighted case indicate otherwise.
The results for HCFD banks are consistent with our hypotheses regarding the UIR. The
beta estimates for both equally and value weighted portfolios are negative and the associated
risk premiums, positive. The same desire to hedge was found for HCNFD and PCNFD but not
for PCFD and PCFD2. Overall, highly capitalised banks and very weak banks exhibit the
wish to hedge against UIR but as long as a bank is functionally diversified, even if it is poorly
capitalised, it is not concerned with interest rate risk factors.
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Finally, HCFD and HCNFD banks do not appear to hedge against UMR, whereas PCFD
and PCNFD banks do. Perhaps, the highly capitalised banks hold higher levels of capital to
hedge against the possible future default of their borrowers while their poorly capitalised
counterparts look for other means to control for such events occurring.

6.

Conclusion
Overall, our results indicate that the highly capitalised banks in our sample yield higher

stock returns but may be in fact more risky because the high levels of capital they hold reflect
their perceptions of riskiness in their lending portfolios. Although the capital adequacy ratios
were introduced to strengthen banks from the risks inherent to financial intermediation, it
appears that these banks holding more capital are merely compensating for undertaking riskier
loans instead of aiming to strengthen their balance sheets. In comparison, diversified banks’
returns were less volatile, echoing the benefits that diversification brings to the stabilisation of
income for these banks. Our results also indicate that constructing value weighted portfolios
will yield more consistent and meaningful estimates than equally weighted portfolios.
There were three main lessons to be drawn from our results. If banks are not going to be
functionally diversified and rely on the traditional forms of banking, they must hold higher
levels of capital to ensure their safety and soundness. However, in the case of functionally
diversified banks, there would not be any use of the banks reporting high capital levels, when
they may be in fact increasing their risk-taking behaviour by making out even riskier loans, in
an effort to replenish equity capital. As long as the banks are functionally diversified, and
provided that the composition of their lending portfolios are not changing for the worse, their
efforts to diversify away risks using other non-interest income earning activities should pay
off and ensure the strength of the banks against deteriorating macroeconomic conditions.
Finally, poorly capitalised banks that are not engaged in adequate diversification activities
should try to adopt at least one characteristic of the other groups. Fortunately, the sample
indicates that there are only three of such banks and so this form of weakness in the banking
system is not prevalent in East Asia.
Additionally, our results established that poorly capitalised banks do not seek to hedge
against market and credit risks. However, highly capitalised banks appear to seek hedging
against credit and interest rate risks. These findings suggest that the banks hold high levels of
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capital in an active effort to protect themselves against unanticipated risk factors. High capital
levels also seem to be an effective means for protecting against possible future losses on loan
portfolios, measured by the maturity risk factor.
The empirical evidence supports our hypotheses. With the importance of stable banking
systems in ensuring strong financial and economic systems, the capital adequacy guidelines
proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have the potential to strengthen
banks in the Asia-Pacific region, provided that consistent classifications are established in
these countries. As banks are becoming increasingly universal, the benefits of corporate
diversification have shown encouraging results. Thus, the role of prudential regulation and
market disciplinary forces will continue to be crucial for banks.
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Notes
1.

Landschoot and Vander Vennet (2001) conducted a similar study with a sample of
banks from Europe, Norway, Switzerland, U.S., Canada and Australia. Their study
accounted primarily on credit risk, but also examined the effects of bank risk profiles on
market and maturity risks. All banks in their sample conformed to the BIS capital
adequacy standard of 8%.

2.

Additional evidence showing that banks do reduce lending to riskier companies in an
effort to control capital levels on their balance sheets have also been presented by Dahl
and Shrieves (1990), Peek and Rosengren (1997) and Jacques and Nigro (1997).

3.

Sironi (2002) also warns that with recent developments in capital regulation, the role of
prudential supervision would be outdated and the role of market forces in controlling
banks’ risk taking behaviour must be increased. Crockett (2002) notes that in order for
market disciplinary forces to be effective, the market must possess sufficient
information, sufficient processing ability for that information, the right incentives to act
on them and the proper channels to exercise discipline.

4.

CAMEL indicators are capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings
and liquidity.

5.

Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997, p. 226) also present an excellent interpretation of
the APT model that allows for multiple risk factors in approximating expected returns.

6.

All relevant data was obtained from Datastream.

7.

With the introduction of the new risk profile group PCFD2, the sample size of the group
decreases to 27 banks and therefore the total sample reduces to 91 banks.

8.

Orders of 6 to 10 were also tested and all revealed the same results as an order of 5.

9.

Granger causality tests were conducted on UCR, UIR and UMR and so causal
relationships were found between the variables for lags up to 5 time periods.
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Table 1: Number of banks in each risk profile group
Non-Interest Income
Total Income
FD > 15%
NFD < 15%
Total Equity
HC > 6%
56
5
Total Assets
PC < 6%
98
3
Notes: This table shows the breakdown of the 162 banks used in this study into the various risk profile groups.
Highly capitalised (HC) banks are those with an equity-to-assets ratio of over 6%, and Functionally Diversified
(FD) banks are those with a ratio of non-interest income to total income of more than 15%. These thresholds are
applied by Fitch/IBCA Bankscope in assessment of banks and producing their credit ratings.
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Table 2: VAR estimation results for CR, IR and MR
VAR estimation results for
CR
CR(-1)
0.96012
39.69700
[.000]

Coef
T-ratio

IR(-1)
0.01052
2.43990
[.016]

Serial Correlation Functional Form
15.14110
0.02156
[.234]
[.883]

MR(-1)
-0.01302
-1.45270
[.149]

M
0.00030
0.19279
[.847]

Normality
2.27520
[.321]

Heteroscedasticity
0.00159
[.968]

MR(-1)
0.10217
3.24470
[.002]

M
-0.00743
-1.37170
[.173]

Normality
187.38090
[.000]

Heteroscedasticity
7.05490
[.008]

MR(-1)
0.93918
31.61710
[.000]

M
0.00536
1.04960
[.296]

Normality
23.17310
[.000]

Heteroscedasticity
0.88508
[.347]

M(-1)
-0.00303
-1.95460
[.053]

VAR estimation results for
IR
Coef.
T-Ratio

CR(-1)
-0.20023
-2.35550
[.020]

IR(-1)
0.98933
65.31780
[.000]

Serial Correlation Functional Form
24.56830
6.64080
[.017]
[.010]

M(-1)
0.00651
1.19660
[.234]

VAR estimation results for
MR
Coef.
T-ratio

CR(-1)
0.23216
2.89520
[.005]

IR(-1)
-0.01534
-1.07360
[.285]

Serial Correlation Functional Form
7.70080
0.34071
[.808]
[.559]

M(-1)
0.00096
0.18788
[.851]

Notes: The T-ratios for each coefficient is the ratio of the coefficient and its standard error. The probability
values of the T-ratios are reported in parenthesis underneath. Generally, a T-ratio greater than 2, or a probability
value of less than 0.05 indicates that the corresponding coefficient is statistically significant in determining the
dependent variable at a 95% level of significanceIn the diagnostic tests on the residuals, the test for serial
correlation is the Lagrange multiplier test. The test for functional form is the Ramsey's RESET test using the
square of the fitted values. The test for normality is based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals (JB)
and the test for heteroskedasticity is based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values (White
Test). All the diagnostic tests statistics reported are distributed as χ2 under the null and compared against a pvalue, reported in the paranthesis, of 0.05. When the reported p-value is less than 0.05, then the null hypothesis
of no serial correlation, accurate functional form, normality and homoskedasticity are rejected. All statistically
significant probability values are in bold.
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Table 3: Results of Johansen ML test for cointegrating relationships
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix
___________________________________________________________________________________
Order of VAR = 1.
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: CR
IR
MR
List of I(0) variables included in the VAR:
M
M(-1)
List of eigenvalues in descending order:
.15912
.092643
.034015
___________________________________________________________________________________
Null
Alternative Statistic
95% Critical Value
90% Critical Value
r=0
r=1
20.4505
24.3500
22.2600
r<= 1
r=2
11.4719
18.3300
16.2800
r<= 2
r=3
4.0836
11.5400
9.7500
___________________________________________________________________________________
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix
___________________________________________________________________________________
Null
Alternative Statistic
95% Critical Value
90% Critical Value
r=0
r>= 1
36.0061
39.3300
36.2800
r<= 1
r>= 2
15.5555
23.8300
21.2300
r<= 2
r=3
4.0836
11.5400
9.7500
___________________________________________________________________________________
Choice of the Number of Cointegrating Relations Using Model Selection Criteria
___________________________________________________________________________________
Rank
Maximized LL
AIC
SBC
HQC
r=0
1721.6
1709.6
1693.0
1702.9
r=1
1731.8
1714.8
1691.3
1705.3
r=2
1737.6
1717.6
1689.9
1706.3
r=3
1739.6
1718.6
1689.5
1706.8
___________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: When the statistic is less than the critical value, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the
alternative. The r is used to determine the number of cointegrating vectors. Figures in bold show the test results
based on each of the three tests.

Table 4: Number of statistically significant beta estimates
HCFD
HCNFD
PCFD
PCFD2
PCNFD
56
5
98
27
3
18
0
19
8
0
(32.14%)
(19.39%)
(29.63%)
UM
38
3
73
18
3
(67.86%)
(100%)
(74.49%)
(66.67%)
(100%)
UCR
25
0
12
1
0
(44.64%)
(12.25%)
(3.7%)
UIR
23
0
22
9
1
(41.07%)
(22.45%)
(33.3%)
(33.3%)
UMR
11
0
23
12
0
(19.64%)
(23.47%)
(44.4%)
Notes: The number of statistically significant beta estimates were determined by counting the number of
corresponding t-statistics greater than 2 in absolute value. The proportions are reported in the brackets, and are
simply the ratio between the number of significant estimates with the number of banks in each sample/ risk
group.
No. of banks
Intercept
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Table 5: Estimated betas derived from first-pass GMM regression
Equally-weighted portfolios
HCFD
CONST
-0.00153
UM
0.46614
UCR
-14.95657
UIR
-8.02658
UMR
-0.93142

HCNFD
-0.01817
2.09705
-0.06539
-0.49682
-0.42510

PCFD
-0.00550
0.38853
0.21895
-0.11761
-0.69214

PCFD2
-0.00574
-0.55144
-3.13482
-4.25474
1.28406

PCNFD
-0.04718
0.04284
9.31720
-11.56019
6.19220

Ave returns
Std Dev

-0.00039
0.01168

-0.01194
0.00635

-0.00699
0.00812

-0.00767
0.01317

-0.02591
0.03283

Value-weighted portfolios
HCFD
CONST
0.00008
UM
0.01028
UCR
-0.28678
UIR
-0.14595
UMR
-0.08430

HCNFD
0.00001
-0.00121
0.00047
0.00351
0.00681

PCFD
-0.00007
0.00575
-0.04979
-0.00421
-0.03058

PCFD2
-0.00003
0.01977
-0.05169
-0.02501
-0.15535

PCNFD
0.00199
0.21859
-3.05287
-2.47701
-0.41406

Ave returns
Std Dev

-0.00170
0.00230

-0.00007
0.00028

-0.00001
0.00014

-0.00851
0.00638

Ranking based on equally-weighted portfolios
UM
UCR
More sensitive
HCNFD
HCFD
HCFD
PCFD2
PCFD
HCNFD
Least sensitive
PCNFD
PCNFD

UIR
PCNFD
HCFD
HCNFD
PCFD

UMR
HCFD
PCFD
HCNFD
PCNFD

Ranking based on value-weighted portfolios
UM
UCR
More sensitive
PCNFD
PCNFD
HCFD
HCFD
PCFD
PCFD2
Least sensitive
HCNFD
HCNFD

UIR
PCNFD
HCFD
PCFD
HCNFD

UMR
PCNFD
HCFD
PCFD
HCNFD

0.00015
0.00073

Notes: The first pass regressions were estimated according to equation [1] where: Rit = α + βMUMt + βCRUCRt +
βIRUIRt + βMRUMRt +εit. The unanticipated components of the factors have been estimated in the previous
section and tested for cointegration. The ranking criteria is as follows: stronger banks should be less sensitive to
the unanticipated components with relatively smaller betas for UM, less negative values in the case of UCR, UIR
and UMR.
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Table 6: Number of banks rejecting the null hypothesis of satisfactory model specification
Risk Profile Group

No. of JT >

χ 2 critical value

HCFD
HCNFD
PCFD / PCFD2
PCNFD

6
0
6/ 4
0

Note: JT = J-statistic × No. of observations. The χ critical value at 4 degrees of freedom, given a 95%
significance level is 9.488. If JT > 9.488, the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied is
rejected.
2

Table 7: Estimated risk premiums from the second-pass regressions
Equally-weighted portfolios
HCFD
λ0
-0.00408
λM
0.011907
λCR
0.00006
λIR
0.00014
λMR
-0.00013

HCNFD
-0.20078
0.01209
-0.00002
0.00009
0.00011

PCFD
-0.00202
-0.012486
-0.000211
-0.00001
0.00011

PCFD2
-0.00072
-0.014418
-0.00032
0.00005
0.00017

PCNFD
0.02053
-0.00551
-0.00241
0.00414
0.00389

Value-weighted portfolios
HCFD
λ0
-0.00002
λM
0.010970
λCR
-0.00017
λIR
.00061
λMR
-0.001217

HCNFD
0.00011
1.51016
-0.04216
-0.02497
0.01775

PCFD
-0.00001
-0.010631
-0.00006
-0.00162
0.00452

PCFD2
-0.006574
-0.329732
-0.00030
-0.028012
0.01028

PCNFD
-0.01120
0.02489
-0.00113
0.00070
0.01080

Notes: The risk premiums were estimated according to the second-pass regression specified in (3):
µRi = λ0 + βiM λM + βiCR λCR +βiIR λIR +βiMR λMR where µ is the expected equally weighted and value weighted
return for each portfolio group. The statistically significant estimates are in bold, evaluated using t-ratios greater
than 2 in absolute value. T-ratios for HCNFD and PCNFD could not be derived due to the small number of
banks in the samples.

